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I. INTRODUCTION 
Building upon the main theme of this year’s LatCrit 
Conference, Resistance Rising: Theorizing and Building Cross-
Sector Movements, 4 this paper (i.e., our contribution to this larger 
critical conversation) challenges one of the dominant paradigms in 
economics and law: the Coase Theorem.5 Specifically, we present a 
thought-experiment, what we shall call the “pure Coasean version” 
of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game.6 In brief, what if the 
prisoners in this game-theory parable were allowed to 
communicate and bargain with each other instead of being held in 
separate cells, as in the standard version of the dilemma? Would 
our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-optimal 
Coasean bargain, as the Coase Theorem predicts?7 Or, as 
predicted in the standard one-shot version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in which bargaining is not allowed,8 would they still end 
3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as 
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14 
TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., 2013 Biennial LatCrit 
Conference Program Schedule (and Related Events), (2013), available at 
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
m_FinalR.pdf. 
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960). George 
Stigler, however, was the economist who first presented the idea now known 
as the Coase Theorem. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem” 
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id. 
6 See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor 
Books 1993) (providing an overview and history of the origins of the dilemma); 
see also F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners, 5–9 (June 21, 2013) 
[hereinafter Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners] (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593, (explaining the 
prisoner’s parable). 
7 Id.
8 See infra Part I.B.  
 
1168 47 JOHN MARS HALL L. REV. 1168 Vol. 47:4
different from its predecessors, particularly since it had the benefit 
of two years of planning. 
Like the shift in conference scheduling, other changes have 
taken place within the LatCrit entity, including concerted efforts 
to continue a process of institutionalization. In recent years, there 
has been a growing focus on how to capitalize on its critical niche, 
continue cultivating the next generation of critical scholars, and 
ensure that the baton of outsider jurisprudence is passed along. 
Internally, the organization has shifted, including a gradual 
changing of the guard in leadership, so to speak, as well as a 
downsizing in administration. For example, from 2008 to the 
present, the Board of Directors was intentionally downsized, with 
a growing number of Board seats being occupied by junior law 
professors.6  
Another major development is LatCrit’s acquisition of a 
physical space for the organization. The property, Campo Sano 
(Spanish for “Camp Healthy,” or more literally, “Camp Sanity”), is 
a ten-acre parcel of land located in Central Florida.7 Purchased by 
LatCrit in 2011, the space is home to The Living Justice Center 
and the LatCrit Community Campus.8 The physical facility serves 
as a means “to level the playing field and give LatCrit activists a 
fighting chance to be heard.”9 The space is intended 
 
to serve as the hub of their educational, research, 
advocacy and activism to remedy the imbalance and 
deficiencies of the current legal system. Having an 
independent physical base has become critical as 
universities and law schools increasingly are even less 
Naming and Launching a New scourse of Critical Lega  Scholarship, 2
HARV. LATINO L. REV  1 (1997).  
See also LatCrit Biennial Conferences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO 
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latc it.org/ ontent/conferences/l crit-
bie nial-confe ences/ (last visit d July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articl s for some 
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding 
webpage). 
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from
several other stand-alone symp sia: inter alia the South-North Exchange, the
Study Space Seri s, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit
Symposi , LATCRIT: LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY,
INC., http://la crit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/ (last visited 
July 5, 2014). 
6 These include Professors Marc-Tizoc González, Andrea Freeman, and
Cés r Cuahtémoc G rcía Hernández. S e About LatCrit, supra note 3 (listing
t  professors on the LatCrit Board of Directors and th ir respective law
schools).  
7 Campo Sano, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY,
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8  
9 Id. 
290 290
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up defecting?  
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that few scholars have 
explored the possible relation between the Coase Theorem and the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. One important exception is Wayne Eastman, 
a professor at Rutgers Business School, who established a formal 
identity between the Coase Theorem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma.9 
Instead of following Eastman’s approach (i.e., relating the Coase 
Theorem to the Prisoner’s Dilemma),10 we do the opposite. We 
relate the Prisoner’s Dilemma to the Coase Theorem by 
constructing a pure Coasean version of the dilemma. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Part II 
provides some background by presenting the standard 
formulations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in numerical as well as 
algebraic terms. Next, Part III presents our thought-experiment: 
in order to test the true value of the Coase Theorem, we consider a 
“pure Coasean version” of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which 
property rights are well-defined and transactions costs are zero 
(i.e., the prisoners are allowed to openly communicate and bargain 
directly with each other). Part IV explores the effects of (i) 
uncertainty, (ii) exponential discounting, and (iii) elasticity on the 
behavior of the prisoners in the Coasean version of the dilemma. 
Part V considers the role of the prosecutor (and third parties, 
generally) in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the overall complexity of 
the dilemma. Lastly, Part VI identifies conditions under which the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma refutes the Coase Theorem, while Part VII 
concludes. 
 
II. STANDARD VERSIONS OF THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
By way of background, we begin this paper by presenting the 
standard or “canonical” formulation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma – 
by far the most famous story or parable in all of game theory – 
both in numerical and algebraic form.11 Readers who are already 
familiar with the details of the Prisoner’s Dilemma may skip this 
part and proceed to Part III. 
 
A. Numerical Form 
The original formulation of the dilemma is attributed to 
9 See Wayne Eastman, How Coasean Bargaining Entails a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 95–98 (1964) (establishing a formal 
identity between the Coase Theorem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma).  
10 Id. at 90 n.7. 
11 See sources cited supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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Professor Albert Tucker, a mathematician at Princeton University, 
who presented the parable of the prisoners during a guest lecture 
at Stanford University in May 1950.12 Specifically, Professor 
Tucker posed the following hypothetical scenario in a one-page 
mimeograph titled A Two-Person Dilemma that he prepared for 
his guest lecture: 
 
Two men, charged with a joint violation of law, are held  
separately by the police. Each is told that  
(1) if one confesses and the other does not, the former will be  
given a reward of one unit and the latter will be fined two 
units,  
(2) if both confess, each will be fined one unit.  
At the same time each has reason to believe that  
(3)  if neither confesses both will go clear.13
 
In addition, Professor Tucker included the following “payoff 
table” in his mimeo to illustrate his parable: 
 
14
 
Although Professor Tucker does not use the terms “Prisoner’s 
Dilemma” or “Prisoners’ Dilemma” in his original mimeo, he does 
refer to the prisoners’ predicament as “a two-person dilemma” in 
the title of the mimeo.15 More importantly, in Tucker’s original 
telling of his tale, we see all the elements associated with the 
standard version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma:16 
-Two Suspects: I and II are held in separate rooms and thus 
unable to communicate or bargain with each other; 
-Two Choices: confess or not confess; 
-Interdependent Payoffs: the payoffs associated with each 
choice depend upon the choices made by both suspects; 
-Payoff Table: a visual presentation of the parable, or stated 
formally, a reduction of the dilemma to “normal form.” 
The first published account of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
however, does not appear until several years later, when R. 
Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa’s published their classic game-
12 SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN FORBES 
NASH, JR. 118 (1998); POUNDSTONE, supra note 6 at, 117–18. 
13 See Tucker, supra note 3 (presenting the parable of the prisoner).
14 Tucker, supra note 3. 
15 Id.  
16 See id. (presenting all of the essential elements of the standard versions 
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma model). 
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different from i s pred cessors, particularly since it had the benefit
of two years of planning. 
Like the sh ft in conference scheduling, other changes have
taken place wi in the LatCrit entity, including concerted fforts
to continue a process of institutional zation. In recent years, there
as been a growing focus on how to capitalize on its critical niche, 
continue cultivating the next generation of critical scholars, and 
ensure that the baton of outsider jurisprudence is passe along. 
Internally, the organization has shifted, including a gradual 
changing f the guard i  leadership, so to speak, as well as a 
downsizing in administration. For example, f om 2008 to the
present, the Board of Directors was intentionally downsized, with 
a growing number of Board seats being occ p ed by junior law 
professors.6  
Another major dev lopment is LatC it’s acquisition of a 
physical space for the organization. The property, Campo Sano 
(Spanish for “Camp H althy,” or more literally, “Camp Sanity”), is
a ten-acre parcel of land located in Central Florida.7 Purchased by 
LatCrit in 2011, the space is home to The Living Justice Center 
and the LatCrit Community Campus.8 The physical facility serves 
as a means “to level the playing field and give LatCrit activists a 
fighting chance to be heard.”9 The space is intended 
 
to serve as the hub of their educational, research, 
advocacy and activism to remedy the imbalance and 
deficiencies of the current legal system. Having an 
independent physical base has become critical as 
universities and law schools increasingly are even less 
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).  
See also LatCrit Biennial Conferences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO 
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcrit-
biennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous 
confere c s, and providing direct links to view symp s  articles for some
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding 
webpage). 
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from 
several other stand-alone symposia: inter alia the South-North Exchange, the 
Study Space Series, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit 
Symposia, LATCRIT: LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEO Y, 
INC., http://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/ (last visited 
July 5, 2014). 
6 These include Professors Marc-Tizoc González, Andrea Freeman, and 
César Cuahtémoc García Hernández. See About LatCrit, supra note 3 (listing
the professors on the LatCrit Board of Dir ctors and their respective law 
schools).  
7 Campo Sano, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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theory treatise, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical 
Survey: 17
 
The following interpretation [of a two-person, non-zero-
sum game], known as the prisoner’s dilemma, is popular: 
Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The 
district attorney is certain that they are guilty of a 
specific crime, but does not have adequate evidence to 
convict them at trial. He points out to each prisoner that 
each has two alternatives: to confess to the crime the 
police are sure that they have done, or not to confess. If 
they both do not confess, then the district attorney states 
he will book them on some very minor trumped-up 
charge such as petty larceny and illegal possession of a 
weapon, and they will both receive minor punishment; if 
they both confess they will both be prosecuted, but he 
will recommend less than the most severe sentence; but 
if one confesses and the other does not, then the 
confessor will receive lenient treatment for turning 
state’s evidence whereas the latter will get “the book” 
slapped at him.18
 
In addition, Luce and Raiffa express the payoffs of their 
prisoners’ parable in numerical form (i.e., in terms of years in 
prison) in a payoff table, stating that “the strategic problem” in 
this particular parable “might reduce to” the following set of 
payoffs: 
 
19 
 
It is worth noting that Luce and Raiffa specifically included 
Professor Tucker’s strategic game and their own corresponding 
payoff matrix in the chapter devoted to “Two-Person Non-Zero-
17 R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: 
INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (Dover Publications 2012) (1957). 
18 Id. at 95.
19 Id. 
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Sum Non-Cooperative Games.”20 In so doing, Luce and Raiffa 
present the Prisoner’s Dilemma parable in order to illustrate a 
particular model of strategic behavior – what game theorists refer 
to as a “two-person, non-zero-sum, non-cooperative game.”21 This 
standard version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma thus encompasses all 
the elements essential to such two-person, non-zero-sum, non-
cooperative games: 
-First and foremost, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a simple two-
person model or game; there are only two prisoners. This is an 
important simplifying assumption, since there could just as well be 
three, four, or n number of suspects. By reducing the number of 
players in this parable to just two suspects, it simplifies the 
underlying strategic situation. 
-Second, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a non-zero-sum game 
insofar as both suspects can receive light sentences if both are able 
to remain silent instead of snitching. In a zero-sum game, by 
contrast, the gain of one player always comes at the expense of the 
other player. Moreover, in a non-zero-sum game, such as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, a “win-win” outcome is possible, but only if 
both players agree to cooperate with each other.  
-Next, the prisoners in this story are playing a non-
cooperative game. The prisoners are incommunicado insofar as 
they are held in separate cells to prevent them from bargaining 
with each other. Strictly speaking, a non-cooperative game rules 
out the possibility of mutually beneficial Coasean bargaining 
among the players. (For our part, we shall later modify this aspect 
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma when we present our pure Coasean 
version of the dilemma in part two.) 
-Last, but not least, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a one-shot 
game: the prisoners have only one opportunity to play the game. 
Although this requirement is not stated explicitly in Luce and 
Raiffa’s interpretation of the parable, subsequent research has 
shown that cooperation is theoretically possible when the game is 
played many times (iteration) and when the occurrence of the last 
round is uncertain.22 
20 Id. at 94–97. 
21 See generally, John F. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS OF 
MATHEMATICS 286 (1951). Luce and Raiffa, however, were one of the first to 
express this particular type of game in the form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 17. As a further aside, John von Neuman and 
Oskar Morgenstern also presented non-zero-sum games in their foundational 
game theory treatise, but the focus of their work is on cooperative games (i.e. 
games in which bargaining among the players is allowed), not on non-
cooperative games, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. JOHN VON NEUMANN & 
OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 504–86 
(Princeton Univ. Press, 3d ed. 1953). 
22 See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 11 
(Basic Books rev. ed. 2006) (1984) (exploring various resolutions to the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma when one player in this two-person game plays the game 
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schools).  
7 Campo Sano, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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In addition, Luce and Raiffa attribute this standard 
interpretation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma to A.W. Tucker and also 
note that this example “has received considerable attention by 
game theorists.”23 That this particular parable was already 
“popular” by the mid-1950s – and sufficiently well-known among 
mathematicians to be included in Luce and Raiffa’s treatise on 
game theory – is itself telling. But why did this parable become so 
popular so quickly? One possible reason is the realism of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.  
Simply put, Luce and Raiffa’s version of this parable seems to 
capture the legal system “in action,” or, more specifically, how the 
criminal justice system actually operates when the prosecution 
does not have sufficient evidence to go to trial, much less convict 
an individual.24 Briefly, when he is stymied by a lack of evidence, 
the prosecutor must adjust his strategy, for without the 
cooperation of at least one of the prisoners, he will only be able to 
secure a conviction on some “minor trumped-up charge” (to borrow 
Luce and Raiffa’s phrasing). And thus it should come as no 
surprise that the tactics of offering “lenient treatment” for 
cooperation (i.e., getting a suspect to “flip” or turn State’s 
evidence) and of filing “trumped-up charges” (what criminal 
defense attorneys refer to as “overcharging”) are common 
strategies used by prosecutors.25 
 
B. Algebraic or Logical Form 
Thus far, we have presented the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma 
in numerical form, but the payoffs in this model can also be 
presented in algebraic or logical form. Consider, for example, the 
following payoff table, which presents the Prisoner’s Dilemma in 
both numerical and algebraic form: 
with many iterations – “with an indefinite number of interactions, cooperation 
can emerge”); see also Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution 
of Cooperation, 241 SCIENCE 1390, 1391–92 (1981) (presenting a model based 
on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the 
Prisoner's Dilemma game). 
23 LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 17, at 94. 
24 Id. at 94–97.  
25 Id. at 95. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Building upon the main theme of this year’s LatCrit 
Conference, Resistance Rising: Theorizing and Building Cross-
Sector Movements, 4 this paper (i.e., our contribution to this larger 
critical conversation) challenges one of the dominant paradigms in 
economics and law: the Coase Theorem.5 Specifically, we present a 
thought-experiment, what we shall call the “pure Coasean version” 
of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game.6 In brief, what if the 
prisoners in this game-theory parable were allowed to 
communicate and bargain with each other instead of being held in 
separate cells, as in the standard version of the dilemma? Would 
our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-opti al 
Coasean bargain, as the Coase Theorem predicts?7 Or, as 
predicted in the standard one-shot version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in which bargaining is not allowed,8 would they still end 
3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as 
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14 
TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., 2013 Biennial LatCrit 
C nference Progr m Schedule (and Related Events), (2013), available at 
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
m_FinalR.pdf. 
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960). George 
Stigler, however, was the economist who first presented the idea now known 
as the Coase Theorem. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem” 
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id. 
6 See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor 
Books 1993) (providing an overview and history of the origins f the dilemma);
see also F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners, 5–9 (June 21, 2013)
[hereinafter Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners] (unpublish
manuscript) (on file with au hor), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593, (explaining the 
prisoner’s parable). 
7 Id.
8 See infra Part I.B.  
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Here, we shall focus on the descriptive labels C and D and the 
algebraic labels R, S, T, and P. First, the players’ choices or 
“strategy sets” of the players in this matrix now appear in more 
general terms: “cooperation” (“C”) and “defection” (“D”) correspond 
to “confess” and “not confess,” respectively, in the traditional 
version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.27 Likewise, the payoffs are now 
designated in general terms. For example, “Reward” (“R”) 
represents the payoff for mutual cooperation, “Punishment” (“P”) 
represents the payoff for mutual defection, and “Temptation 
payoff” (“T”) and “Sucker’s payoff” (“S”) represent the remaining 
two payoffs.28  
Stated formally (i.e., in general algebraic terms as opposed to 
specific numerical values), a game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma when 
the values of the payoffs are ranked in ordinal fashion: 
T>R>P>S. 29 Moreover, regardless of whether the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is presented in numerical or algebraic form, the outcome 
and logic of this game remain the same: defection is always a 
dominant strategy, or “Nash equilibrium,”30 in the one-shot 
version of the game. 
If the other player cooperates, there is a choice between 
cooperation which yields R (the reward for mutual cooperation) or 
defection which yields T (the temptation to defect). By assumption, 
T > R, so that it pays to defect if the other cooperates. On the other 
hand, if the other player defects, there is a choice between 
cooperation which yields S (the sucker’s payoff) or defection which 
26 Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 22, at 1392. 
27 Id. at 1391–92.  
28 Id. For our part, we shall follow this convention and thus continue to 
refer to the payoffs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma using these standard labels in 
these algebraic or general terms. 
29 See Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 22, at 1392, Figure 1 (identifying 
that the “payoff to Player A is shown with illustrative numerical values[, and] 
[t]he game is defined by T>R>P>S and R>(S+T)/2”). 
30 See, e.g., SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN 
FORBES NASH, JR. 15, 20 (1998). 
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different from its predecessors, particularly since it had the benefit 
of two years of planning. 
Like the shift in conference scheduling, other changes have 
taken place within the LatCrit entity, including concerted efforts 
to continue a process of institutionalization. In recent years, there 
has been a growing focus on how to capitalize on its critical niche, 
continue cultivating the next generation of critical scholars, and 
ensure that the baton of outsider jurisprudence is passed along. 
Internally, the organization has shifted, including a gradual 
changing of the guard in leadership, so to speak, as well as a 
downsizing in administration. For example, from 2008 to the 
present, the Board of Directors was intentionally downsized, with 
a growing number of Board seats being occupied by junior law 
professors.6  
Another major developm nt is LatCrit’s acquisition of a
physic l space for the org ization. The propert , Campo Sano
(Spanish for “Camp Healthy,” or more lite ally, “Cam  Sanity”), is
a ten-acr  parcel f land located in Central Fl rida.7 Purchased by
LatCrit in 2011, the space is home to Th  Liv g Justice Center
and the LatCrit C mmunity Campus.8 The physical facility serves
as a means “to level the playing field and give LatCrit activists a
fighting chance to be heard.”9 The spac  is ntended 
 
to serve as the hub of their educational, r search, 
advocacy and activism to remedy the imbalance and 
deficiencies of the current egal system. Having an 
independent physical b se has bec me critical as 
universities and l w schools increasingly are even les  
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).  
See also LatCrit Biennial Conferences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO 
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcrit-
biennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous 
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articles for some 
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding 
webpage). 
Addit onally, La Crit has develop d a substantial body of scholarship from
several other stand-alone symposia: inter alia the South-North Exchange, the 
Study Space Series, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit 
Symposia, LATCRIT: LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC., http://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/ (last visited 
July 5, 2014). 
6 These include Professors Marc-Tizoc G zález, Andrea Freema , and
César Cuahtémoc García He ná dez. See About LatCrit, supr  note 3 (listing
 prof ssors on th  LatCrit Board of Directors and their respective law 
schools).  
7 Cam o San , LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY,
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/c mpo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id.
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yields P (the punishment for mutual defection). By assumption P > 
S, so it pays to defect if the other player defects. Thus, no matter 
what the other player does, it pays to defect. But, if both defect, 
both get P rather than the larger value of R that both could have 
gotten had both cooperated. Hence, the dilemma.  
With two individuals destined to never meet again, the only 
strategy that can be called a solution to the game is to defect 
always despite the seeming paradoxical outcome that both do 
worse than they could have had they cooperated.31 
Therefore, whether the parable is presented in numerical or 
algebraic form, the central lesson of the standard one-shot version 
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that defection or “snitching” is always 
the Nash equilibrium of the game. Moreover, from an individual 
perspective, both prisoners are always better off by defecting, 
regardless of the other prisoner’s actions. For example, if the other 
prisoner (“Player B”) snitches, Player A might as well snitch to 
avoid S, the sucker’s payoff. In fact, even if the other prisoner 
keeps quiet, Player A is still better off snitching insofar as T, the 
temptation payoff, is always greater than R. 
But what if the prisoners are not held in separate rooms (i.e., 
they are not incommunicado)? What if the prisoners could actually 
bargain with each other and had the ability to make enforceable 
promises and credible threats? Would they still defect? We shall 
consider these questions next by presenting a “Coasean version” of 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, one in which the prisoners are allowed to 
communicate and bargain with each other. 
 
III. COASEAN VERSION OF THE DILEMMA (WITH STRATEGIC AND NON-
STRATEGIC BARGAINING) 
The previous section discussed the standard version of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which both players are separated with no 
means to communicate with each other. This section, however, 
removes the element of separation and presents a theoretical test 
of the Coase Theorem through a novel thought-experiment – a 
pure Coasean version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, one in which 
bargaining and communication are allowed between the prisoners. 
First, we compare the standard version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
with the Coase Theorem, identifying the main conditions of the 
theorem: (i) the existence of a “reciprocal” conflict between two 
parties; (ii) well-defined property rights; and (iii) zero transaction 
costs. Next, we explain how our pure Coasean version of the 
31 Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 22, at 1391. 
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thought-experiment, what we shall call the “pure Coasean version” 
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separate cells, as in the standard version of the dilemma? Would 
our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-optimal 
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TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., 2013 Biennial LatCrit 
Conference Program Schedule (and Related Events), (2013), available at
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Stigler, however, was the economist who first presented the idea now known 
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(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem” 
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id. 
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Books 1993) (providing an overview and history of the origins of the dilemma); 
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7 Id.
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Prisoner’s Dilemma satisfies these conditions, specifically 
considering the application of strategic as well as non-strategic 
bargaining in the Coasean or zero transaction cost version of the 
dilemma. 
 
A. A Tale of Two Parables: Parable of the Rancher and the 
Farmer and Parable of the Prisoners 
Broadly speaking, two of the most important ideas in 
economics and law are the Coase Theorem and the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, and each has generated a vast technical literature – a 
scholarly sea of Borgesian proportions.32 And yet, each of these 
profoundly influential contributions is based on a simple parable: 
Ronald Coase’s “Parable of the Rancher and the Farmer”33 and the 
game-theoretic “Parable of the Prisoners.”34 In summary, Coase’s 
parable concerns two pastoral neighbors, a cattle rancher and a 
crop farmer,35 while Tucker’s tale involves two criminal suspects 
apprehended by the police.36 Although these memorable parables 
evoke wildly different and divergent worlds (i.e., a bucolic world of 
neighboring farms and ranches on the one hand versus a film noir 
world of cops and robbers on the other), from an economic 
perspective, these simple stories share an essential facet in 
common. In brief, both parables depict rational actors whose 
interests collide. In the one case, the conflict arises out of cattle 
trespass (i.e., the rancher’s cattle trampled the farmer’s crops); in 
the other, each prisoner must decide whether to betray or remain 
loyal to the other.37 
Nevertheless, although both parables portray rational parties 
with opposing or conflicting interests, these stories diverge in one 
32 At last count (July 25, 2014), for example, an electronic search for the 
term “Coase theorem” generates 25,200 results. GOOGLE SCHOLAR, 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22coase+theorem%22&btnG=&hl=en&as
_sdt=0%2C14 (last visited July 25, 2014). A search for the term “prisoner’s 
dilemma,” however, produces more than four times as many results (107,000). 
Id. at 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22prisoner%27s+dilemma%22&btnG=&
hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C14 (last visited July 24, 2014). 
33 See Coase, supra note 5, at 2–15 (presenting the “Parable of the Rancher 
and the Farmer”). See also F. E. Guerra-Pujol, Modelling the Coase Theorem, 5 
EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 141–42 (2012) [hereinafter Guerra-Pujol, Modelling] 
(combining Coase’s intuitive insights with the formal methods of game theory); 
Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in 
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 624–25 (1986) (reporting the results of 
an attempt to explore the realism of the “Parable of the Rancher and the 
Farmer”). 
34 LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 17; Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the 
Prisoners, supra note 6; Tucker, supra note 3. 
35 Coase, supra note 5, at 2–15. 
36 Tucker, supra note 3. 
37 Id.; Coase, supra note 5, at 2–15. 
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to serve as the hub of their educational, research, 
advocacy and activi m to remedy the imbalance and 
d fici n ies of the c rrent l gal system. Having an 
independent physical base has become critical as 
universitie  and law schools incr asingly are eve  ess 
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).  
See lso LatCrit Bi nnial Confe nces, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO 
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/content/co ferences/latcrit-
biennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous 
conferences, and provi ing direct links to view symposia articles for some 
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding 
webpage). 
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from 
several other stand-alo e symposia: inter alia the South-North Exchange, the
Study Sp ce Series, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit
Symposia, LATCRIT: LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY,
INC., http://l tcrit.org/conte t/publications/latcrit-symposium/ (l st visited
July 5, 2014). 
6 These include Professors Marc-Tizoc González, And ea Freeman, and
Cés r Cuahtémoc García Hernández. See About LatCrit, supr  note 3 (listing
the professors on the LatCrit Board of Directors and their respective law 
schools).  
7 Campo S o, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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important respect: the ability, or lack thereof, of the parties to 
settle their differences through bilateral negotiations or Coasean 
bargaining. That is, the most salient distinction between the 
hypothetical worlds of the Coase Theorem and the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is the ability to bargain. In the former case, the rancher 
and the farmer are fully able to bargain with each other and 
negotiate a mutually beneficial enforceable agreement.38 In the 
latter story, however, the prisoners have no such option; they are 
held in separate cells and unable to talk, much less bargain with 
one another.39 This ability, or inability, of the parties to deal with 
each other is of critical importance, at least in the traditional 
telling of each tale. In the one case, a Coasean bargain between 
the rancher and the farmer produces an optimal result or 
Panglossian outcome (i.e., an efficient allocation of resources 
devoted to the production of crops and meat).40 In the other case, 
the parties’ inability to bargain with each other inevitably leads to 
mutual betrayal and a worse outcome (longer prison sentences) for 
both prisoners.41 
Suffice it to say, however, few scholars have explored the 
relation between these two important models. One exception is 
Wayne Eastman, a professor at Rutgers Business School, who 
identified the conditions under which Coasean bargaining 
constitutes a Prisoner’s Dilemma.42 Specifically, he models Coase’s 
rancher-farmer parable as a Prisoner’s Dilemma and establishes a 
formal identity between the Coase Theorem and the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.43 Our approach in this paper, however, is different than 
Eastman’s. Instead of relating the Coase Theorem to the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, as Eastman does, we do the opposite.44 We relate the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma to the Coase Theorem by constructing a 
Coasean version of the dilemma.45 Specifically, we pose the 
following questions: what if the prisoners were, in fact, allowed to 
communicate and bargain with each other in Coasean fashion? 
That is, what if our hapless prisoners were able to negotiate a 
mutually beneficial and legally enforceable agreement? Would 
38Coase, supra note 5, at 2–15. 
39 LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 17; Tucker, supra note 3. 
40 Coase, supra note 5, at 2–15. 
41 Tucker, supra note 3. 
42 Eastman, supra note 9. 
43 Id.  
44 See id. at 90 n.7 (noting very deliberately that his proposition “relates 
the [Coase] Theorem to the [Prisoner’s] Dilemma, rather than vice versa” and 
his reasons for electing to do so).  
45 See Guerra-Pujol, Modelling, supra note 35 (providing a different game-
theoretic formulation of the Coase Theorem). 
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and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id. 
6 See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor 
Books 1993) (providi g an overview and history of the origins of the dilemma); 
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7 Id.
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they still defect or would they somehow decide to cooperate as 
postulated by the Coase Theorem?  
 
B. The Three Conditions of the Coase Theorem  
Before attempting to answer the above questions, we shall 
first identify and review the main conditions of the Coase 
Theorem. Professor Coase introduced the counterintuitive idea 
now known as the “Coase Theorem” with a memorable parable 
about cattle trespass.46 The rancher-farmer parable, however, is 
really a story about joint interactions involving bargaining and 
property rights. That is, Coase posed a well-defined reciprocal 
problem using the example of cattle trespass and then imagined 
what would happen if the affected parties (i.e., the rancher and the 
farmer) could solve this problem through voluntary bargaining.47 
(Ultimately, this is the same question that we pose about the 
prisoners in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.) Coase observed that when (i) 
the costs of transacting are zero (a standard assumption in 
economics) and (ii) property rights are well-defined, “Coasean 
bargaining” (i.e., voluntary negotiations) among the affected 
parties will produce an efficient economic outcome.48 Although this 
economic “theorem” has been stated in many different ways over 
the years,49 the necessary elements of the Coase theorem remain 
constant: (i) the existence of a reciprocal conflict, (ii) well-defined 
property rights, and (iii) zero transactions costs (i.e., no 
impediments to bargaining).50 Accordingly, we shall now show how 
our pure Coasean version of the dilemma satisfies all three 
standard conditions of the Coase Theorem. 
 
1. Reciprocal Nature of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
First and foremost, we wish to point out the “reciprocal 
nature”51 of the prisoners’ plight in all versions of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. Although this aspect of Coase’s work is often overlooked 
or neglected in the law and economics literature, we believe it is 
Coase’s most original and counterintuitive insight. Consider, for 
46 Coase, supra note 5, at 2–15. 
47 Id. 
48 See Coase, supra note 5, at 2–15 (noting when “Coasean bargaining” will 
produce an efficient economic outcome). See also Ronald H. Coase, The Federal 
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25–30 (1959) (noting when 
“Coasean bargaining” will produce an efficient economic outcome). 
49 See STEVEN G. MEDEMA & RICHARD O. ZERBE, The Coase Theorem, 1 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE HISTORY AND 
METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 837–38 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & 
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (providing an extensive listing of some of the 
various statements of the Coase Theorem). 
50 Coase, supra note 5, at 2–15. 
51 Id. at 1–2.  
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different from its predecessors, particularly since it had th  benefit
of two y ars of planning. 
Like the shift in conference scheduling, other changes have 
taken place within th  LatCrit entity, including c ncerted efforts 
to continue a process of institutionalization. In recent years, there 
has be n a growing focus on how to capitalize on its critical niche,
con inue cultiv ting the nex  generation of critical scholars, and
ensu  that th  baton of outsider jurisprudence is passed along.
Internally, the organiz tion has shifted, including a gradual
changing of h  guard in leadership, so to spe k, as ell as a
downsizing in dministratio . For example, from 2008 to the
es n , the Board of D rectors was intentiona y downsiz d, with
a growing umb r of Board seats being occupie by junior law
professors.6  
Another major development is LatCrit’s acquisition of a
physic l space for the organization. The property, Camp  Sano
(Spanish for “Camp Healthy,” or ore literally, “Camp Sanity”), is
a ten-acre parcel of land loc t d in Central Flori a.7 P rchased by
LatCrit in 2011, the spac  is home to The Living Justice Center
and the LatCr t Community Campus.8 The physical facility s rv s
as a means “t  level th  playing field and give LatCrit activis s a
fighting chance to be heard.”9 The space is inten ed 
 
to serve as th  hub of thei  educational, research, 
advocacy and activ sm to remedy the imbalance and
deficiencies of the current legal system. Having an
independent physical base has become cr tical as 
universities and law schools increasingly are even less 
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).  
See also LatCrit Biennial Conferences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcrit-
biennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous 
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articles for some 
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding 
webpage). 
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from 
several other stand-alone symposia: inter alia the South-North Exchange, the 
Study Space Series, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit 
Symposia, LATCRIT: LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY,
INC., http://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/ (last visited
July 5, 2014). 
6 These include Profess rs M rc-Tizoc González, Andrea Freeman, and 
César Cuahtémoc García Hernández. See About LatCrit, supr  note 3 (listing
the professors on the LatCrit Board of Directors and their respective law
schools).  
7 Campo Sano, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY,
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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example, Coase’s parable of the rancher and the farmer.52 
According to Coase, it is a fallacy to think that the problem of 
cattle trespass is caused solely by the rancher.53 In reality, cattle 
trespass (i.e., the risk of potential harm to the farmer’s crops) is a 
joint problem.54 Just as the rancher can reduce the risk of harm by 
reducing the size of his herd or erecting a boundary fence, so too 
can the farmer, either by planting cattle-resistant crops or by 
putting up the fence himself.55 Likewise, the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
also presents a reciprocal problem insofar as the payoffs for both 
prisoners stem from their independently made choices to defect or 
cooperate.56 Thus, if both prisoners end up defecting in the 
standard one-shot version of the game (as game theory predicts 
they will do), then the prisoners have only themselves to blame for 
their collective plight.57 In short, the prisoners’ plight, like the 
problem of cattle trespass, is the product of a joint interaction: the 
outcome in both cases is not determined by the actions of just one 
party, but rather by the choices made by both of them jointly. 
 
2. Well-Defined Property Rights  
Does the second condition of the Coase Theorem (i.e., the legal 
assignment of well-defined property rights to one of the conflicting 
parties) apply to the Prisoner’s Dilemma? If so, what property 
rights are being traded in the standard version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma? 
Recall that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a compelling parable 
about betrayal and loyalty, a secular morality tale about the 
conflict between individual and collective rationality. Strictly 
speaking, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is not a story about property per 
se; however, property rights do play a secondary role in the 
dilemma. From a libertarian or classical liberal perspective, the 
prisoners have a vested property right in their personal liberty, 
and although personal liberty is often considered to be an 
inalienable (i.e., non-negotiable) right,58 what is a plea bargain but 
52 Id. at 2–15. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 1–2. 
55 See F. E. Guerra-Pujol & Orlando I. Martinez-Garcia, Clones and the 
Coase Theorem, 2 JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL DEVIANCE 43, 65-73 (2011) 
(providing an extended discussion of the reciprocal nature of the rancher-
farmer parable). 
56 Tucker, supra note 3. 
57 Tucker, supra note 3. 
58 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1849, 1903–06 (1987) (discussing the commoditization of negative liberty). Of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Building upon the main the e of this year’s LatCrit 
Conference, Resistance Rising: Theorizing and Building Cross-
Sector Movements, 4 this paper (i.e., our contribution to this larger 
critical conversation) challenges one of the dominant paradigms in 
econo ics and law: the Coase Theorem.5 Specifically, we present a 
thought-experiment, what we shall call the “pure Coasean version” 
of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game.6 In brief, what if the 
prisoners in this game-theory parable were allowed to 
communicate and bargain with each other instead of being held in 
separate cells, as in the standard version of the dilemma? Would 
our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-optimal 
Coasean bargain, as the Coase Theorem predicts?7 Or, as 
predicted in the standard one-shot version of the Prisoner’s 
ile a in which bargaining is not allowed,8 would they still end 
3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as 
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14 
TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., 2013 Biennial LatCrit 
Conference P gram Schedule (and Related Events), (2013), ava lable at 
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
m_FinalR.pdf. 
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960). George 
Stigler, however, was the economist who first presented the idea now known 
as the Coase Theorem. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem” 
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id. 
6 See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor 
Books 1993) (providing an overview and history of the origins of the dilemma);
see also F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners, 5–9 (June 21, 3
[here nafter Guerra-Pujol, The Parabl of the Prison rs] (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://papers.s rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593, (explaining the 
prisoner’s parable). 
7 Id.
8 See infra Part I.B.  
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a judicially sanctioned trade of one’s personal liberty? When a 
criminal suspect is offered a plea bargain, the prosecutor is, in 
effect, asking the suspect to relinquish some of his personal liberty 
(i.e., he agrees to a certain but reduced prison sentence – x years) 
in exchange for avoiding the possibility of a maximum prison 
sentence (e.g., 5x or 10x years).59  
This broad definition of property (i.e., “liberty as property”) is 
consistent with traditional conceptions of property rights. The 
legal philosopher Stephen Munzer and the late political theorist 
C.B. Macpherson, among others, have described in detail different 
conceptions of property rights; in particular, property in the 
classical or common law sense refers to everything (tangible or 
intangible) to which a person has a right, including the right to 
personal liberty.60 In the words of Macpherson, “men were said to 
have a property not only in land and goods and in claims on 
revenues for leases, mortgages, patents, monopolies and so on, but 
also a property in their lives and persons.”61 Although this 
classical conception of property is circular,62 our larger point here 
is that personal liberty is an intangible property right, a right that 
can be bargained away in certain situations, as in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.  
 
3. Zero Transaction Costs, Strategic Behavior, and Non-Strategic 
Bargaining 
Stated in Coasean terms, the rules in the standard version of 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e., no bargaining) artificially generate 
high transaction costs. But what if we change these rules to allow 
bargaining? That is, what if we imagine a Coasean version of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, one with zero transactions costs? 
Some scholars of the Coase Theorem, however, have already 
noted that parties, even parties who find themselves in a low 
course, the most famous statement of this idea appears in the U.S. Declaration 
of Independence of July 4, 1776. 
59 Note that we do not mean to express our normative approval of plea 
bargains in criminal cases. We are simply making a descriptive point here 
about the secondary role of property rights in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
60 See C. B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, PROPERTY: 
MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL CONCEPTIONS 1, 8 (C. B. Macpherson, ed., Univ. of 
Toronto Press 1978) (identifying property as “a right – a somewhat uncertain 
right that has constantly to be re-asserted”); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY 
OF PROPERTY 90 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) (identifying “liberty” among a 
list of items that should be considered personal goods (i.e. personal property) 
insofar as “they are often valued either in themselves or as means to other 
things that are valued or both”); Cheryl L. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 
HARV. L.R. 1707, 1724–31 (1993) (providing a general overview of the broad 
historical concept of property). 
61 C.B. Macpherson, supra note 64, at 7.  
62 This conception of property is circular, since all it is saying, in effect, is 
that one has a right to what one has a right to. 
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different from its predecessors, particularly si ce it had the benefit
of two years of planning. 
Like the shift in onference scheduling, other cha ges have
taken pl ce within the LatCrit ntity, including co rted effo ts
to continue a p ocess of ins itutionalization. In recent years, there
has been a rowing focus on how to capitalize on its critical niche, 
continue cultivating the next generation of critical sch lars, and
ensure that the baton f outsider juri prudence is passed along.
Internally, the organization has shifted, including  gradual
changing of the guard in leadership, so to speak, as well as a
d wnsizing in administration. For example, from 2008 to
pre ent, the Board of Director  was intentionally downsized, with
a growing number of Board se ts be ng occupied by junior law
rofessors.6  
Another major development is LatCrit’s acquisition of a
physical spac  for the organization. The property, Camp  Sano
(Spanish for “Camp Healthy,” or more lit ally, “Camp Sanity”), 
a ten-acre parcel of land loca ed in Central Florida.7 Purchased by
La Crit in 2011, the space is home to The Livin  Justice Center
and the LatCrit Community Campus.8 The phy ical facility serve
as a eans “to level the playing field and give LatCrit activists a 
fighting chance to be heard.”9 The space is intended 
 
to serve as the hub of their educational, research, 
advocacy and activism to remedy the imbalance and 
deficiencies of the current legal syst m. H ving an 
indep ndent physical base has become cr tical as 
universities and law sc ools increasi ly are even less 
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).  
See also LatCrit Biennial Conferences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO 
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcrit-
biennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articles for some 
years (found by followi g th  respective year’s link o its corresp nding
webpage). 
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from 
several other stand-alone symposia: inter ali  the South-N rth Exchange, the
Study Space Series, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit
Symposia, LATCRIT: LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY,
INC., h tp://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/ (last visited
July 5, 2014).
6 These include Professors Ma c-Tizoc González, Andrea Freeman, and
César Cuah émoc García Hernánd z. See About LatCrit, supra note 3 (listing
e professors on the LatCrit Board of Directors and their respective law
schools).  
7 C mpo San , LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/conten /campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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transaction cost setting, may act strategically and thus fail to 
strike a mutually beneficial Coasean bargain.63 Here, we shall 
contribute to the literature on the Coase Theorem in two ways. 
First, building on the work of Wayne Eastman, we shall consider 
strategic behavior in the form of promises and threats and explain 
why such strategic behavior might prevent the formation of 
Coasean bargains between the prisoners—even when they are 
allowed to communicate with each other. Next, building on the 
work of John Nash, we shall consider the possibility of non-
strategic bargaining by the prisoners. 
 
4. Strategic Bargaining, Threats and Promises in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma 
One of the central lessons of game theory is that one can often 
– but not always, as we shall soon see – gain a tactical advantage 
during negotiations by committing oneself (or pre-committing, so 
to speak) to a particular strategy, such as a costly threat or an 
enforceable promise.64 This insight is often referred to as the “first-
mover advantage,”65 and the ability to make one’s threats or 
promises believable is considered a “credible commitment.”66 The 
Coasean version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, however, poses an 
especially difficult challenge to the Coase Theorem because there 
is no-first mover advantage in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
In summary, there is no first-mover advantage in the 
Coasean version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma due to the possibility of 
strategic behavior. Assume, for example, that Prisoner 1 decides to 
63 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 
75 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 787–91 (1990) (arguing that the failure of the Coase 
theorem to predict real world outcomes” is frequently explained by “the failure 
of the relevant actors” as opposed to “high transaction costs” Id. at 788); 
ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 242–44 (Scott 
Foresman & Co., 2d ed. 1982); and Robert Ellickson, “Of Coase and Cattle: 
Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 
625 n.4 (1986) (proposing that “negotiations in bilateral monopoly situations 
can be costly because the parties may act strategically”). 
64 See, e.g., AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING 
STRATEGICALLY 124–26 (W.W. Norton, reprt. ed. 1993) (asserting that 
strategic moves are two-pronged: (i) the planned course of action and (ii) the 
commitment that makes this course credible); see also DOUGLAS BAIRD, ET AL., 
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 43-44 (1994). 
65 Roger A. Kerin, P. Rajan Varadarajan & Robert A. Peterson, First-Mover 
Advantage: A Synthesis, Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions, 
56 J. MARKETING , Oct., 1992, at 33, 33. 
66 See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 
J. INST’L THEORETICAL ECON 11-12 (Mar. 1993) (identifying that the 
enforcement is “central to credible commitment”). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Building upon the main theme of this year’s LatCrit 
Conference, Resistance Rising: Theorizing and Building Cross-
Sector Movements, 4 this paper (i.e., our contribution to this larger 
critical conversation) challenges one of the dominant paradigms in 
economics and law: the Coase Theorem.5 Specifically, we present a 
thought-experiment, what we shall call the “pure Coasean version” 
of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game.6 In brief, what if the 
prisoners in this game-theory parable were allowed to 
communicate and bargain with each other instead of being held in 
separate cells, as in the standard version of the dile ma? Would 
our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-optimal 
Coasean bargain, as the Coase Theorem predicts?7 Or, as 
predicted in the standard one-shot version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in which bargaining is not allowed,8 would they still end 
3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as 
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14 
TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., 2013 Biennial LatCrit
Conference Program Schedule (and Relat d Events), (2013), available at
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
m_FinalR.pdf. 
5 The Coase Theorem is name after he late Ronald o se. Ronald H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960). George
Stigler, however, was the economist who first presented the idea now known
as the Coase Theorem. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem”
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id.
6 See gener lly WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor
Books 1993) (providing an overview and history of the origins of the dilemma);
see also F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners, 5–9 (June 21, 2013) 
[hereinaft Gu ra- ujol, The Parable of th  Prison ] (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593, (explaining the 
prisoner’s parable). 
7 Id.
8 S e infra Part I.B.  
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pre-commit to cooperation and is able to communicate his 
cooperative commitment to Prisoner 2, say by taking a sincere and 
solemn oath in Prisoner 2’s presence to remain silent “no matter 
what.”67 Also, assume that Prisoner 2 truly believes in the 
sincerity and seriousness of the other prisoner’s solemn oath. That 
is, he knows that Prisoner 1 is a man of his word. Perversely, the 
logic of defection continues to prevail, for defection or confessing is 
still Prisoner 2’s dominant strategy. In fact, Prisoner 2 has an 
even stronger incentive to defect in this situation because he is 
now certain to obtain the temptation payoff, given the other 
prisoner’s binding promise not to defect. 
Knowing this, what if Prisoner 1 took a different approach 
and made a credible threat instead of a mere promise? That is, 
assume now that Prisoner 1 is able to make and communicate a 
credible threat to punish the other prisoner in the event that the 
latter decides to defect. Introducing the tactical use of a credible 
threat, however, dramatically changes the payoffs of the game.68 
In other words, an enforceable agreement backed up by a credible 
threat changes the values of the payoffs of the prisoners.69 
Therefore, strictly speaking, under these facts, the prisoners are 
no longer playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Stated formally, a credible threat changes Prisoner 2’s 
temptation payoff, T; specifically, the value of T decreases as the 
severity of the threat increases.70 But, let us put this technical 
objection to one side and consider the possibility of non-strategic 
bargaining by the prisoners in the Coasean version of the 
dilemma. 
 
5. Non-Strategic Coasean Bargaining 
Assume that the prisoners can bargain with each other and 
can make credible threats and binding promises.71 Without a 
67 For clarity, we shall follow Luce & Raiffa’s interpretation of the parable 
and continue to refer to Player A as “Prisoner 1” and Player B as “Prisoner 2” 
in the remainder of this paper. 
68 Cf. Wayne Eastman, Everything is up for Grabs: The Coasean Story in 
Game-Theoretic Terms, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 1–37 (1996) (discussing the 
idea of “payoff mutability”) 
69 See, e.g., Elinor Ostram, et al., Covenants with and without a Sword: 
Self-Governance Is Possible, 86 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 404, 
413–414 (1992) (reviewing the “payoff consequences” of selecting or not 
selection a sanctioning mechanism in a common-pool resource game). 
70 Recall that a Prisoner’s Dilemma occurs when the values of the payoffs 
are T > R > P > S. (See supra part I.B..) The employment of a credible threat, 
however, changes this payoff structure to R > P > S > T, or to R > P > T > S, or 
perhaps to R > T > P > S, depending on the severity of the threat and the 
resulting new value of T. 
71 Recall that the payoffs in the dilemma can be stated numerically or 
algebraically by the variables T, R, P, and S. We will follow this convention in 
the remainder of this paper. 
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different from its predecessors, part cul rly since it had the benef t
of two years f planning. 
Like t e shift i  conference s heduling, other cha ges have
taken place within th LatCrit entity, including concerted efforts
to ontinue a process of instituti nalizat on. In recent ye rs, there
has bee  a growing focus on how to capital ze on its c itical niche,
c ntinue cul vating the next g nerati n of r tical s holar , and
ensure that the baton of outsider jurisprudence is passed long.
Internally, the organization has shifted, including  gradual
changing of the gu rd in leadership, so to speak, as well as a
downsizing in administrati n. For example, from 2008 to the 
present, the Board of Directors was intention lly dow sized, wit
 growing number of Bo rd seats being occupied by junior law
professors.6 
Ano er major development is LatCrit’s acquisi ion of a
physical space for the organization. The property, Campo Sano
(Spanish for “Camp He lthy,” or mor  literally, “Camp Sanity”), is
a ten-acre parcel of land locat d in Central Flori a.7 Purchas  by
LatCrit in 2011, sp ce is home to The Living Justice C nter
and the LatCrit Community Campus.8 The physical facility serves
as a m ans “to level the playing field and give LatCrit activists a 
fighting chance to be he rd.”9 The space is intended 
 
o serve as the hub of their educational, research, 
advocacy and activism to emedy the imbala ce and 
deficiencies of the current legal syst m. Having an 
independent physical base has become critical as 
universities and law schools increasingly are even less 
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).  
See also LatCrit Biennial Conferences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO 
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcrit-
biennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous
conferences, and providing di ect links to view symposia articles for some
years (found by ollowing the respective year’s link to its corresponding 
webpage). 
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarsh p from
several other stand-a one symposia: inter alia the South-North Exchange, the 
Study Space Series, the International and Comparative Colloq ia. LatCrit
ymposia, LATCRIT: LATCRIT: L TINA & LATINO CRITI AL LEGAL THEORY
INC., http://latcrit.org/co tent/publications/latcrit-symposium/ (last visited
July 5, 2014). 
6 These include Pr fessors Marc-Tizo  González, Andrea Freeman, and
César Cuahtémoc García Hernández. See About LatCrit, supra note 3 (listing
the professors on the LatCri  Board of Directors and their respective law
schools).  
7 Campo S no, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/c ntent/campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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Coasean bargain, both prisoners will most likely end up confessing 
– or “defecting” in the parlance of game theory – because defection 
is the only Nash equilibrium in the standard one-shot version of 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Since the defection payoff is equal to P 
(i.e., the “punishment” payoff for mutual defection), Prisoner 1’s 
payoff is equal to P1, while Prisoner 2’s payoff is P2. In the 
standard version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, however, P1 is equal 
to P2, since the payoffs are symmetrical. Following convention, and 
because these are the payoffs the prisoners will most likely receive 
if they are unable to bargain with each other, we shall refer to 
these defection payoffs as the “outside options” or “disagreement 
values” of the prisoners.72  
If, however, the prisoners agree to cooperate – a likely 
outcome if bargaining is allowed – the prisoners will receive R, the 
“reward” payoff for mutual cooperation. Therefore, both prisoners 
are better off cooperating because cooperation produces a collective 
gain for both prisoners (i.e., R > P). Or put another way, the gains 
from a Coasean bargain in the Prisoner’s Dilemma are positive 
(i.e., R – P > 0). (This all assumes, of course, that neither prisoner 
breaches the agreement – a possibility that we will explore later.) 
But how will the prisoners split the collective gains from their 
Coasean bargain? Stated formally, Prisoner 1 will receive (R + P1 – 
P2)/2, and Prisoner 2 will receive (R + P2 – P1)/2. Therefore, each 
prisoner’s share of the payoffs depends, not only on the value of his 
gains from trade or the Coasean bargain (i.e., the reward payoff, 
R), but also on the prisoners’ outside options or disagreement 
values (i.e., P1 and P2). 73 Nevertheless, in the standard version of 
the dilemma, since the prisoners’ outside options are the same 
(i.e., P1 = P2) neither prisoner in the Coasean version of the game 
can improve his bargaining position by improving his outside 
option or decreasing that of the other prisoner (i.e., each prisoner’s 
payoff for mutual cooperation is equal to R/2). Accordingly, since 
the payoffs in the standard version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma are 
symmetrical, they will split their gains evenly. 
Thus far, this analysis suggests that the prisoners have every 
incentive to strike a Coasean bargain and cooperate, so long as 
R/2 > P. But, notice what this analysis does not tell us. It does not 
tell us whether the prisoners will, in fact, keep their mutual 
72 Cf. LUKE M. FROEB, BRIAN T. MCCANN, MIKHAEL SHOR & MICHAEL R. 
WARD, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: A PROBLEM SOLVING APPROACH 190 (3d ed., 
2014).) 
73 See John F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 157-
158 (1951). Note that Nash uses the term “anticipations” to refer to the outside 
options or disagreement values of the players. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Building upon the main theme of this year’s LatCrit 
Conference, Resistance Rising: Theorizing and Building Cross-
Sector Movements, 4 this paper (i.e., our contribution to this larger 
critical conversation) challenges one of the dominant paradigms in 
economics and law: the Coase Theorem.5 Specifically, we present a 
thought-experiment, what we shall call the “pure Coasean version” 
of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game.6 In brief, what if the 
prisoners in this game-theory parable were allowed to 
communicate and bargain with each other instead of being held in 
separate cells, as in the standard version of the dilemma? Would 
our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-optimal 
Coasean bargain, as the Coase Theorem predicts?7 Or, as 
predicted in the standard one-shot version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in which bargaining is not allowed,8 would they still end 
3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as 
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14 
TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., 2013 Biennial LatCrit 
Conference Program Schedule (and Related Events), (2013), available at
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
m_FinalR.pdf. 
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960). George 
Stigler, however, was the economist who first presented the idea now known 
as the Coase Theorem. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem” 
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id. 
6 See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor 
Books 1993) (providing an overview and history of the origins of the dilemma); 
see also F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners, 5–9 (June 21, 2013) 
[hereinafter Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners] (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593, (explaining the 
prisoner’s parable). 
7 Id.
8 See infr  Part I.B. 
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promises or whether they will breach them. In fact, a Coasean 
bargain may not solve the Coasean version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma because T, the temptation payoff, still lurks in the 
background. So long as T remains larger than R, each prisoner has 
a countervailing incentive to breach his promise of cooperation: the 
larger T is, relative to R, the more likely it is that one or both of 
the prisoners will defect.  
 
IV. THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY, EXPONENTIAL DISCOUNTING, AND 
ELASTICITY IN THE COASEAN VERSION OF THE PRISONER’S 
DILEMMA 
Even when the prisoners are allowed to bargain with each 
other – either strategically or non-strategically, as in our Coasean 
thought-experiment above – and even when they are able to make 
credible threats, the prisoners may still end up defecting. It is true 
that the use of credible threats might change the temptation 
payoff relative to the other payoffs; however, there are three non-
trivial reasons why it might not. First, uncertainty poses a major 
problem with threats, since there will always exist some level of 
uncertainty as to whether a threat will in fact be carried out. 
Another salient problem with threats is exponential discounting or 
the time dimension of a given threat; this is particularly relevant 
since most threats, however credible, will not be carried out until 
sometime in the future. Lastly, another potential problem with 
threats is the issue of price elasticity of demand, since the 
prisoners’ responsiveness to a threat may vary depending on a 
number of factors. 
A. Uncertainty 
“Uncertainty” refers to the positive probability that any 
Coasean bargain made between the prisoners will not be enforced 
due to judicial error or some other extrajudicial factor. Essentially, 
one’s decision to defect in the Coasean version of the dilemma will 
not only be a function of the severity of the penalty for breach (i.e., 
any threats or promises made during the course of the prisoners’ 
negotiations), but it will also be a function of the probability of 
enforcement. Both of these functions – severity of penalty and 
probability of enforcement – are uncertain ex ante (i.e., at the time 
one must decide whether to defect or not). Generally speaking, the 
less likely enforcement is, or the less severe the penalty for breach 
is, the more likely the prisoners will defect. 
One possible response to the problem of uncertainty is to 
extend the logic of zero transactions costs to the enforcement 
stage. Since the Coase Theorem assumes costless bargaining, why 
not further assume costless enforcement? Could we not assume 
that the prisoners are not only allowed to bargain and make 
credible threats and promises, but also that any resulting 
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ensure that the baton of outsider jurisprudence is passed along. 
Internally, the organization has shifted, including a gradual 
changing of the guard in leadership, so to speak, as well as a 
downsizing in administration. For example, from 2008 to the 
present, the Board of Directors was intentionally downsized, with 
a growi g number of Board seats being occupied by junior law
professors.6  
Another ajor development is LatCrit’s cquisition of a
physical space for the rganization. The property, Campo Sano
(Spanish for “Camp Hea thy,” or more literally, “Camp Sanity”), is
a ten-acre parcel of land located in Central Florida.7 Purchased by 
LatCrit in 2011, the space is home to The Liv g Ju tice Cente
and the La Crit Community Campus.8 The physical facility serves
as a means “to level the playing field and give LatCrit activists a
figh ing chance to be heard.”9 The space is intended 
 
to serve s t e hub of th ir educa ional, esearch, 
advocacy and activism to remedy the imbalance and 
def ciencies of the curr nt legal system. Having an
independent phy ical base has become critical as 
universi ie  and law schools increasingly are even less 
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).  
See also LatCrit Biennial Confe ences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcrit-
biennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous 
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articles for some 
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding 
webpage). 
Additionally, La Crit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from
several other sta d-alone symposia: inter alia the South-North Exchange, the 
Study Space Series, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit 
Symposia, LATCRIT: LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC., http://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/ (last visited 
July 5, 2014). 
6 These include P ofessors Marc-Tizoc González, Andrea Freeman, and
César Cua témoc García Hernández. See About LatCrit, supra note 3 (listi g 
the professors on the LatCrit Board of Directors and their respective law 
schools).  
7 Campo Sano, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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agreement to cooperate will be enforced perfectly and costlessly? 
This, in turn, raises a new question: does Coasean bargaining 
solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma even when enforcement is costless 
and perfect? Not necessarily, for the answer to our question now 
depends on how far in the future such enforcement will occur. 
 
B. Exponential Discounting 
The next question we shall consider is what role does time 
play in the Coasean version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma? In general, 
notice that the Prisoner’s Dilemma presents an intertemporal 
choice. Each prisoner must weigh not only the probability that the 
other will defect in the absence of a Coasean bargain (or the 
probability of breach even with a Coasean bargain), but each 
prisoner must also weigh the present value of his own defection or 
breach versus the future value of cooperation. 
Assume that the prisoners are allowed to bargain with each 
other and have each promised to cooperate in order to obtain the 
higher collective payoffs generated from mutual cooperation. Even 
with a Coasean bargain in place, each prisoner must weigh the 
present value of breaching his promise (i.e., defecting) versus the 
future or discounted value of cooperating (i.e., keeping his 
promise). That is, each prisoner must still decide whether he 
prefers a reduced sentence in the present, which is a higher payoff 
relative to his other choices, versus the possibility of a penalty for 
breach in the future.  
According to the standard economic model of behavior, 
intertemporal choices are no different from other choices, except 
that some consequences are delayed and hence must be 
anticipated and “discounted” (i.e., recalibrated to take into account 
the delay).74 But discounting generates the possibility of 
“exponential discounting.” That is, given two similar rewards, 
people generally prefer the one that arrives sooner rather than the 
equivalent one later. Stated formally, people often “discount” or 
reduce the value of the later reward by a factor that increases with 
the length of the delay. This discounting process is traditionally 
modeled in economics as a form of exponential discounting, a time-
consistent model of discounting.75 
74 See, e.g., A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 108–09 (John Black, Nigar 
Hashimzade & Gareth Myles eds., 4th ed. 2012) (providing a standard 
definition of “discount” and “discounting the future” in economics). 
75 Some experimental research has shown that the constant discount rate 
assumed in exponential discounting is systematically being violated. Shane 
Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and 
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thought-experiment, what we shall call the “pure Coasean version” 
of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game.6 In brief, what if the 
prisoners in this game-theory parable were allowed to 
communicate and bargain with each other instead of being held in 
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our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-optimal 
Coasean bargain, as the Coase Theorem predicts?7 Or, as 
predicted in the standard one-shot version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in which bargaining is not allowed,8 would they still end 
3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as 
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14 
TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 L tina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., 2013 Biennial LatCrit 
Conference Program Schedule (and Related Events), (2013), available at
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
m_FinalR.pdf. 
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960). George 
Stigler, however, was the economist who first presented the idea now known 
as th  Coase Theorem. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem” 
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id. 
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7 Id.
8 See infra Part I.B.  
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In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, our prisoners are more 
likely to engage in exponential discounting when calculating the 
present value of a reduced prison sentence (i.e., the greater their 
discount rate is, the more they value present personal liberty over 
future liberty, and thus the more they value present liberty over 
future liberty, the more likely they are to defect). Does a Coasean 
bargain between the prisoners change this outcome? Not at all – 
the outcome will not change if the present value or utility of a 
reduced sentence today is greater than the expected or discounted 
disutility of a penalty for breach in the distant future. In other 
words, it is possible that the temptation payoff, which is certain 
and will occur at time T1, might outweigh the possibility of a 
breach penalty, which is uncertain and will not occur until time 
T2. 
Thus, because any penalty for breach will occur in the future, 
the present utility from a (certain) reduced prison sentence now is 
likely to outweigh the future disutility of an (uncertain) penalty for 
breach in the future! Of course, whether the discounted disutility 
of a future penalty for breach outweighs the present value of a 
reduced sentence depends on several critical variables, including 
(i) the size of the future or expected penalty, (ii) the probability 
that the breach is enforced, and (iii) each prisoner’s discount rate. 
More to the point, however, we have identified the conditions 
under which our prisoners are likely to defect even with a Coasean 
bargain in place. And, even under the standard assumptions in 
modern economic theory, these conditions are not implausible or 
far-fetched. 
Compare, for example, the related idea of interest (i.e., time 
value of money), a foundational concept in finance theory.76 A 
certain amount of money today has a different buying power 
(value) than the same amount of money in the future because the 
value of money at a future point of time includes the interest 
earned or inflation accrued over a given period of time.77 In the 
alternative, the time value of money can also be stated formally: 
the sum of FV (future value) to be received in one year is 
discounted at the rate of interest r to give a sum of PV (present 
value) at present (i.e., PV = FV – r*PV = FV/(1+r)). This 
expression measures the present value of a future sum, discounted 
to the present by an amount equal to the time value of money. In 
other words, this concept allows the valuation of a future stream of 
Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002). This 
paper, however, will follow the standard economic approach and assume a 
constant discount rate. 
76 DAVID G. LUENBERGER, INVESTMENT SCIENCE ch. 2 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1998). 
77 That is, the value of money changes over time because there is an 
opportunity to earn interest on the money and because inflation will tend to 
drive prices up, thus reducing the “value” of the money in the future. Id. at 12.  
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income, such that the future steam is “discounted” and then added 
together, thus providing a lump-sum “present value” today of the 
entire income stream. 
Like the time value of money, there is also a time value of 
time, so to speak. One way of measuring the magnitude of each 
prisoner’s incentive to breach (i.e., the probability that either 
prisoner will breach or defect), even with a Coasean bargain in 
place, is by analyzing the role that time plays in his or her 
decision-making. The prisoners not only prefer personal liberty to 
the absence thereof (time in prison), but we would also expect the 
value or utility of liberty in the present to be worth more to each 
prisoner than liberty in the future. In other words, the “time value 
of time” means that personal liberty in the present is worth more 
than in the future, and likewise, time in prison in the present 
imposes a greater disutility than time in prison in the future.  In 
addition, independent of the effect that time has on the decision-
making of the prisoners, we must further consider the prisoners’ 
responsiveness to the payoffs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. That is, 
in predicting whether the prisoners will defect or cooperate in the 
Coasean version of the dilemma, the price elasticity of demand of 
each prisoner must also be considered. 
 
C. Price Elasticity of Demand  
Here, we pose one last important question regarding our 
Coasean version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. If a prison sentence 
operates like a price,78 then what happens when the price 
elasticity of demand of each prisoner is different? In economics, 
the term “elasticity” generally refers to the percentage change in 
one variable with respect to a percentage change in another 
variable, or the ratio of the logarithmic derivatives of the two 
variables.79 Specifically, the “price elasticity of demand” is a 
numerical or quantitative measure of how responsive the demand 
of a given good or service is to a change in the price of that good or 
service. In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example, the 
“good” being demanded by the prisoners is personal liberty (i.e., a 
reduced prison sentence). Elasticity in this case would thus 
measure the prisoners’ responsiveness to changes in the prison 
sentence. 
78 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach, 76 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 169, 179-180 (1968). 
79 HARRY H. PANJER, FINANCIAL ECONOMICS WITH APPLICATIONS 101 
(Actuarial Found. 1998). See also CAMPBELL MCCONNELL, STANLEY BRUE, 
AND SEAN FLYNN, ECONOMICS 114-116 (18th ed. 2009). 
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Thus far, however, we have assumed that the prisoners’ 
elasticities are the same, a standard but unstated assumption in 
most, if not all, treatments of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Specifically, 
we have assumed that both prisoners share a “unitary elastic” (i.e., 
e = 1) demand schedule. In other words, we have assumed that the 
prisoners share the same set of time preferences regarding the 
payoffs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma: they both uniformly prefer 
shorter prison sentences to longer ones. Stated formally, we have 
not only assumed that the prisoners derive a greater amount of 
utility (or a lower level of disutility) the shorter their prison 
sentences are, but we have also assumed that the prisoners obtain 
the same levels of “utility” or “disutility,” as the case may be, from 
the payoffs (prison sentences) in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. (Note 
that in economics, “utility” is an abstract or mathematical 
representation of preferences over some set of goods and 
services.80) In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, an additional 
unit of time in prison generates an additional, and perhaps 
diminishing, level of disutility on the prisoners. 
Thus, the question above (i.e., what happens if the prisoners’ 
elasticities of demand are different?) becomes: what happens when 
Prisoner 1’s demand for personal liberty (i.e. a reduced sentence) is 
inelastic (i.e., e1 < 1), while Prisoner 2’s demand for liberty is 
elastic (i.e., e2 > 1)? 
Before we proceed to answer this question, let us explain 
“inelastic” and “elastic” demand and illustrate these concepts with 
a simple numerical example. The demand of a good is “elastic” 
(i.e., more responsive to price changes) when the percentage 
change in the price of that good is less than the percentage change 
in quantity demanded.81 For example, when e = 1.5, this means 
that a 50% decline in price will cause a 75% increase in the 
quantity demanded.82 In contrast, demand is “inelastic,” or less 
responsive to changes in price, when the percentage change in the 
price of a good exceeds the percentage change in quantity 
demanded.83 For example, when e = 0.5, this means that a 50% 
decline in price will only cause a 25% increase in the quantity 
demanded.84 Thus, in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the 
concept of elasticity refers to the prisoners’ responsiveness to 
changes in the payoffs of the game. For example, Prisoner 1 might 
be highly responsive to small changes in the prison sentence; as 
such, his demand for personal liberty would be elastic. On the 
80 For an influential treatment of utilities in economics, see VON NEUMANN 
& MORGENSTERN, supra note 21, at ch. 3, 17–31 (providing a mathematical 
treatment of utilities and assigning utilities to probability distributions of 
alternatives). 
81 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 67, at 29. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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biennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous 
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articles for some 
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding 
webpage). 
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from
several other stand-alone symposia: inter alia the South-North Excha ge, the 
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other hand, Prisoner 2 might be far less responsive even to large 
changes in the payoffs, and therefore, his demand for liberty would 
be inelastic. 
The most important determinant of the price elasticity of 
demand is the availability of substitutes for the good in question.85 
Generally speaking, the elasticity of demand will be greater where 
there are more substitutes for a particular good, and, likewise, the 
elasticity will be lower where there are fewer substitutes.86 In the 
case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, however, the responsiveness of the 
prisoners to the payoffs may vary depending on certain individual 
factors unique to each prisoner. Although there are few, if any, 
substitutes for personal liberty (i.e., you are either free or in 
prison), the level of disutility of being in prison may vary 
depending on a wide variety of individual factors, such as, inter 
alia, one’s age, income, marital status, or history of prior 
convictions. We would expect a young prisoner, a wealthy prisoner, 
or a prisoner with a wife and children, for example, to behave 
differently than an old prisoner, a poor one, or one with no family 
ties. Likewise, a prisoner who is a first-time offender, might 
qualify for probation or a rehabilitation program, whereas a repeat 
offender might face a mandatory-minimum prison term. In 
addition, we would expect the quality of the prison sentence or 
type of prison (i.e., a high security prison with limited visitation 
rights versus a low security, college-campus type prison with a 
good library, internet access, and liberal visitation rights) – and 
not just the quantity of time in prison – to influence the behavior 
of the prisoners in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
In other words, the use of general labels, such as “Prisoner 1” 
and “Prisoner 2” (or “A” and “B”), to describe the players in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is too reductionist and possibly even 
misleading because such labels abstract away the problem of 
elasticity. Accordingly, we need more – not less – information 
about the prisoners’ individual circumstances and specific 
characteristics in order to measure their respective responsiveness 
to the payoffs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
Instead of ignoring this critical information, let us now 
proceed under a different set of assumptions. In the following 
three examples, assume that we have sufficient information about 
the individual prisoners in order to measure or at least 
approximate their actual elasticities. Example #1 assumes that 
the price elasticity of demand for personal liberty of both prisoners 
85 Id. at 29. 
86 “The more substitutes for a good, the greater the elasticity of demand; 
the fewer the substitutes, the lower the elasticity.” Id. at 29–30. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Building upon the main theme of this year’s LatCrit 
Conference, Resistance Rising: Theorizing and Building Cross-
Sector Movements, 4 this paper (i.e., our contribution to this larger 
critical conversation) challenges one of the dominant paradigms in 
economics and law: the Coase Theorem.5 Specifically, we present a 
thought-experiment, what we shall call the “pure Coasean version” 
of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game.6 In brief, what if the 
prisoners in this game-theory parable were allowed to 
communicate and bargain with each other instead of being held in 
separate cells, as in the standard version of the dilemma? Would 
our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-optimal 
Coasean bargain, as the Coase Theorem predicts?7 Or, as 
predicted in the standard one-shot version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in which bargaining is not allowed,8 would they still end 
3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as 
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14 
TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., 2013 Biennial LatCrit 
Conf rence Progr m Schedule (and Related Events), (2013), avai able at 
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
m_FinalR.pdf. 
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960). George 
Stigler, however, was the eco omist who first presented the idea now known 
as the Co se Theorem. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem” 
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id. 
6 See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor 
Books 1993) (providing an overview and history of the origins of the dilemma); 
see also F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners, 5–9 (June 21, 2013) 
[ ereinafter Guerra-Pujol, The Pa able f the Prisoners] (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593, (explaining the 
prisoner’s parable). 
7 Id.
8 Se  infra Part I.B.  
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is elastic (i.e., e > 1). Example #2 considers the more interesting 
case of a highly inelastic prisoner playing against a highly elastic 
one. And, Example #3 considers prisoners with inelastic demand 
curves (i.e., e < 1). 
Example #1: e > 1 
To begin, assume that both prisoners are highly elastic (i.e., 
responsive) to changes in the payoffs in the standard version of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this case, we would expect no change in 
the prisoners’ responses to the payoffs in the game because their 
levels of utility or disutility from the payoffs remain unchanged 
relative to each other. So long as the responsiveness of the 
prisoners to changes in the payoffs run in the same direction (i.e., 
so long as both prisoners are price elastic or price inelastic), both 
prisoners still prefer to spend less time in prison to more time. 
Example #2:  e > 1, e < 1  
Next, consider the more interesting case of a highly inelastic 
prisoner playing against a highly elastic one. Contrary to the first 
example, assume that the corresponding elasticities of the 
prisoners in the standard one-shot version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma run in opposite directions: Prisoner 1’s demand for 
personal liberty is highly elastic (i.e., e1 > 10), while Prisoner 2’s 
desire to stay out of prison is highly inelastic (i.e., e2 < 0.1). Under 
these conditions, both prisoners still prefer short prison sentences 
to long ones, but Prisoner 1 is much more responsive to any 
changes in the payoffs of the Prisoner’s Dilemma than Prisoner 2 
is. Does this scenario alter the likely outcome or equilibrium of the 
dilemma? 
We believe it does. Under this scenario, Prisoner 1 is much 
more likely to defect than Prisoner 2 because Prisoner 1, as 
“defined” by his elasticity curve, is more responsive to the payoffs 
of the game. In particular, Prisoner 1 – like Prisoner 2 – wants (i) 
the lowest possible sentence (i.e., T, the Temptation Payoff) and 
(ii) to avoid the worst possible payoff (i.e., S, the dreaded Sucker’s 
Payoff). However, Prisoner 1 – unlike Prisoner 2 – is more 
responsive to the possibility of (i) obtaining the Temptation Payoff, 
as well as (ii) avoiding the humiliating Sucker’s Payoff. 
What about Prisoner 1’s inelastic cohort, Prisoner 2? By 
definition, Prisoner 2 is less responsive to changes in the payoffs 
than Prisoner 1 because Prisoner 2’s demand for liberty is highly 
inelastic (i.e., e2 < 0.1). Prisoner 2’s behavior, therefore, will be 
much harder to predict for multiple reasons. On the one hand, 
Prisoner 2 – like all prisoners, presumably – prefers a short prison 
sentence to a long one. On the other hand, Prisoner 2 (i.e., e2 < 0.1) 
is less responsive to changes in the payoffs than the average 
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diff rent from its predecessors, parti ularly ince it had the benefit
of tw  years of pla ning. 
Like the shift in conference scheduling, other changes h ve
taken place within the LatCrit entity, including concerted efforts 
to continue a process of institutionalization. In recent years, there 
has been a growing focus on how to capitalize on its critical niche, 
continue cultivating the next generation of critical scholars, and 
ensure that the baton of outsider jurisprudence is passed along.
Inter ally, the or anization has shif ed, including a gradual
changing of the guard in leadership, s  to speak, as well as a
downsizing in admini tration. For exampl , from 2008 to the
present, the Board of Directors was intenti nally downsized, with
a growing number of Board seats being occu ied by juni r law
ofessors.6  
Another major d velopment is LatCrit’s acquisition of a
hysical space for the organization. The pr perty, Campo Sano 
(Spanish for “Camp Healthy,” or more literally, “Camp Sanity”), is 
a ten-acre parcel of land located in Central Florida.7 Purchased by 
LatCrit in 2011, the space is home to The Living Justice Center 
and th  LatCrit Community Campu .8 The physical facility serves
as a means “to level the playing field and give LatCrit ac ivists a
fighting ch nce to be eard.”9 The space is intended 
 
to serve as the hub of heir educational, res arch, 
advocacy and activism to remedy the imbalance a d 
deficiencies the current legal ystem  Having an 
independent p ysical base has become critical as 
univer ities and law schools increasingly are even less 
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).  
See also LatCrit Bienni l Conferences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcrit-
biennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous 
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articles for some 
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding 
webpage). 
Additionally, LatCrit ha  developed a substantial body of scholarship from
several other stand-alone symposia: inter alia the South-North Exchange, the 
Study Space Series, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit 
Symposia, LATCRIT: LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC., http://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/ (last visited 
July 5, 2014). 
6 These include Profe sors Marc-Tizoc González, Andrea Freeman, and
César Cuahtémoc García Hernández. See About LatCrit, supra note 3 (listing 
the professors on the LatCrit Board of Directors and their respective law 
schools).  
7 Campo Sano, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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prisoner (i.e., e = 1), and is far less responsive to such changes 
than Prisoner 1 (i.e., e1 > 10). We would thus expect Prisoner 2 to 
be highly unresponsive to the prosecutor’s strategic offer of 
leniency in exchange for his confession. 
Therefore, whether Prisoner 2 decides to defect or to 
cooperate will, most likely, depend on his personal value system 
and other relevant or applicable extra-strategic factors (e.g. age, 
income, marital status, etc.). And yet, it is these factors that are 
completely ignored or abstracted away in game theory. Put 
another way, if Prisoner 2 is already predisposed to reject any 
potential plea bargain or offer of leniency from the prosecutor (e.g. 
because of Prisoner 2’s value system), then he is unlikely to 
confess or accept a plea bargain ex post (i.e., after the prosecutor’s 
offer of a reduced sentence is on the table).87 
Example #3: e < 1 
Lastly, what happens when both prisoners’ demand curves 
are highly inelastic? Or, what is the most likely outcome or 
equilibrium of the game when both prisoners are highly 
unresponsive to changes in the payoff structure of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma? Simply put, all bets are off in this scenario. Similar to 
the discussion concerning Prisoner 2 in example #2 above, factors 
external to the Prisoner’s Dilemma model will influence the 
behavior of the prisoners in this example more than the actual 
payoffs. 
D. Lessons and Discussion 
These three examples of the role of elasticity in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma teach us an important and non-trivial lesson about the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma model and about game theory in general. 
Game theory is best able to predict the behavior of players in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (and other games) when their demand curves 
are inelastic (i.e., e < 1) but not when the demand schedules are 
elastic (i.e., e > 1) or when their elasticities are unitary (i.e., e = 1). 
Since the behavior of such inelastic players will depend less on the 
payoffs of a given model and more on real-world factors outside of 
the formal model, the predictive power of game theory will 
decrease as the prisoners’ preferences become more responsive 
(i.e., their demand curves become more elastic). Indeed, this lesson 
87 But it is worth noting that if Prisoner 2 is already predisposed ex ante to 
confess or strike a deal with the prosecutor (for reasons not captured in the 
abstract Prisoner’s Dilemma model), then he will probably still confess ex post, 
despite his highly inelastic demand curve. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Building upon the main theme of this year’s LatCrit 
Conference, Resistance Rising: Theorizing and Building Cross-
Sector Movements, 4 this paper (i.e., our contribution to this larger 
critical conversation) challenges one of the dominant paradigms in 
economics and law: the Coase Theorem.5 Specifically, we present a 
thought-experiment, what we shall call the “pure Coasean version” 
of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game.6 In brief, what if the 
prisoners in this game-theory parable were allowed to 
communicate and bargain with each other instead of being held in 
separate cells, as in the standard version of the dilemma? Would 
our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-optimal 
Coasean bargain, as the Coase Theorem predicts?7 Or, as 
predicted in the standard one-shot version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in which bargaining is not allowed,8 would they still end 
3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as 
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14 
TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., 2013 Bie nial LatCrit 
Conference Program Schedul  ( d Related Events), (2013), available at 
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
m_FinalR.pdf. 
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960). George 
Stigler, however, was the economist who first presented the idea now known 
as the Coas  The em. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem” 
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id. 
6 See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor 
Books 1993) (providing an overview and history of the origins of the dilemma); 
see also F. E. Guerra-P jol, The Parable of the Prisoners, 5–9 (June 21, 2013) 
[hereinafter Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners] (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://papers. srn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593, (explaining the
prisoner’s parable).
7 Id.
8 See nfra Part I.B.  
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is not only consistent with one of the key insights of Thomas 
Schelling’s classic study “The Strategy of Conflict.”88 It also builds 
upon Schelling’s seminal work by specifying the limits of game 
theory. By studying the theoretical relation between the behavior 
and choices of the players and their respective elasticities of 
demand, our work has identified circumstances in which game 
theory models are likely to be helpful and when they are likely to 
prove incomplete, misleading, or wrong.  
 
V. A BRIEF DIGRESSION REGARDING THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES IN 
THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
Before proceeding any further, we shall return one last time 
to the standard, or non-Coasean version, of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma to explore the relation between the prisoners and the 
prosecutor in the standard version of this parable. Stated in 
general terms, we shall consider the relation of the “third-party 
payoff administrator” to Players 1 and 2 in the general or logical 
form of the game. 
Whatever one thinks of our Coasean thought-experiment or 
Coasean version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is worth noting that 
Coasean bargaining is already taking place, even in the standard 
versions of the parable presented above. But instead of direct 
bargaining between the prisoners themselves (which as we saw is 
not allowed in the standard version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma), 
the bargaining that is taking place in this game is between each 
prisoner and the prosecutor separately. 
The standard formulations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
presuppose not just two prisoners or players but also a “third-
party payoff administrator” (such as the prosecutor in the original 
formulation of the parable). That is, in addition to the players or 
prisoners, the Prisoner’s Dilemma also requires a third-party to 
administer the payoffs of this game, with payoffs depending on the 
choices made by the players.89 This third party is not really a 
neutral arbiter or mere “payoff administrator.” Instead, he is 
trying to manipulate the choices of the players by getting them to 
confess or “snitch” in the classic version of the parable, and, 
moreover, his conduct is another form of “bargaining” with the 
players. 
The presence of the prosecutor or “third-party payoff 
administrator” in the standard versions of the parable thus poses 
an important but neglected subsidiary question.90 Doesn’t the 
88 See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (2d 
ed. 1980). 
89 For example, Richard Dawkins refers to the role of the “banker” in his 
presentation of the parable. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GAME 203, 206–
07, 217–18, 225–26 (2d ed. 1989). 
90 See, e.g., F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Poker-Litigation Game 3, n.5 (Dec. 26, 
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presence of this third party (i.e., his ability to offer lighter 
sentences or more favorable payoffs to the prisoners) affect the 
outcome of the game? Would the prisoners still defect in the one-
shot version of the parable if the role of the prosecutor or other 
third party were removed from the game? 
Recall that the standard or “canonical” version of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is classified as a “non-cooperative game” 
because the prisoners in the dilemma are not allowed to 
communicate or negotiate with each other. 91 Nevertheless, 
although the prisoners are not allowed to bargain with one 
another, it is critical to note that the prosecutor is, in fact, allowed 
to communicate and bargain with the prisoners. The prosecutor in 
the standard versions of the dilemma is, in essence, bargaining 
with each prisoner separately and sequentially, making a 
tempting “take it or leave it” offer to each one. Although neither 
prisoner is allowed to make a counteroffer to the prosecutor, each 
prisoner must still decide whether to accept the prosecutor’s initial 
offer. In the standard one-shot version of the dilemma, both 
prisoners will most likely accept the prosecutor’s offer (i.e., agree 
to confess), because confession is the dominant strategy or Nash 
equilibrium of this game.  
In short, the prisoners are, in fact, already engaged in a form 
of Coasean or voluntary bargaining in the standard version of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Although they are not allowed to bargain 
with each other, they are allowed to bargain, so to speak, with the 
prosecutor. But, the collective outcome of these separate Coasean 
bargains with the prosecutor leaves both prisoners much worse off 
than if they had decided to reject the prosecutor’s offer and remain 
silent. 
This analysis of the dilemma thus refutes the Coase Theorem; 
it shows how self-seeking Coasean bargaining (i.e., Coasean 
bargaining between each prisoner and the prosecutor) generates a 
worse collective outcome for the prisoners. One could argue that 
this conclusion is premature because, given the structure of the 
payoffs in the standard version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is 
very likely that the prisoners would have defected anyways. But 
this conclusion is not premature at all, at least not with respect to 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. For the prisoners to defect, they must be 
able to strike a bargain with the prosecutor. That is, there must be 
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193993 (providing a 
simple model in which the role of the banker is made explicit).  
91 See Tucker, supra note 3 and accompanying text; LUCE & RAIFFA, supra 
note 17, at 94–95 and accompanying text. 
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someone (i.e., the prosecutor) with the ability to offer a lighter 
prison sentence in exchange for the prisoners’ confessions. By 
contrast, if the District Attorney is prevented from bargaining 
with the prisoners, or if the prisoners are prevented from 
bargaining with the D.A., then it is less likely that the prisoners 
will end up defecting. In short, in a world in which “plea 
bargaining” is prohibited, the prisoners are probably better off 
going to trial and taking their chances. 
Despite this analysis, most game theorists would probably 
agree that, due to the structure of the payoffs in the standard 
“one-shot” version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, defection is still the 
most likely outcome in one-shot dilemmas – even when all 
bargaining is prohibited. Once we allow Coasean bargaining 
between the prisoners, however, we see that there are three sets of 
potential bargains in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Specifically, there is 
the possibility of a Coasean bargain between the prisoners 
themselves, especially in the Coasean version of the dilemma, but 
there is also the possibility of a separate bargain between Prisoner 
1 and the prosecutor as well as the possibility of an additional 
bargain between Prisoner 2 and the prosecutor. The possibility of 
three separate sets of bargains in the Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests 
that the outcome of such a three-person interaction might be a 
complex one and possibly unpredictable. We thus conclude this 
paper by conducting a preliminary exploration of the relation 
between complexity theory and the Coasean version of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.  
 
VI. SOME CLOSING THOUGHTS ON THE COMPLEXITY OF THE 
PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
The classic or standard version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
paints a misleading picture of the game being played and the 
number of players. It purports to be a two-player model when, in 
reality, there are at least three different persons playing this game: 
the two prisoners as well as the prosecutor (and the police). 
Therefore, instead of a dyad or two-party interaction, we have a 
triad or three-party interaction, one that is more complex and with 
many more relevant variables. Such stories as the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma and the Rancher-Farmer Parable, however, purposely 
ignore such endogenous and exogenous variables – variables that 
could very well influence the outcome of these interactions. In a 
real-life Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example, the prisoners are likely 
to find themselves embedded in a larger network of players, all of 
whom are ignored in the existing legal and economics literature on 
the Coase Theorem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Suffice it to say, the different variables that shape the 
preferences of the prisoners and the prosecutor make the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma a potentially very complex game. Moreover, as 
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differe t from i s predec ssors, particularly since it had the benefit
of two years of pla ning. 
Like the shift in conferenc  scheduling, other changes have
taken place within the LatCrit entity, including conc rted ef orts
to continue a process of institutionalization. In recent y ars, th e
has b en a growing focus on how to capitalize on its critical niche,
continue cultivating th  next generation of critical scholars, and
ensure that the b to  of outsider jurisprudence is passed along. 
Internally, the organization has shifted, including a gradual
changing of th  guard in leadership, so to speak, as well as a
d wn izing in administration. For example, from 2008 to 
pre ent, the Board of Directors was intentionally dow sized, with
a grow number of Board seats being occupied by junior law
professors.6  
Anothe  major development is LatCrit’s acquisition of a
p ysical space f r the organization. The prop rty, Campo Sano
(Spanish for “Camp Healthy,” or more literally, “Camp Sanity”), is
a ten-acre parc l of land located in Central Florida.7 Purchased by
LatCrit in 2011, the space is home to The L ving Justice Center
and the LatCrit Community Campus.8 The physical facility serves
as a means “to level the playing field and give LatCrit ctivist  a
fighting chance to be heard.”9 Th  s ace is intended 
 
to serve as the hub of their educational, research, 
advocacy and activism to rem dy the imbalance and 
deficiencies of the current legal system. Having an 
independent physical base has become critical as 
universities and law schools increasingly are even less
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).  
See also L tC it Biennial Conferences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/co tent/conferences/l tcrit-
biennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous 
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articles for some 
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding 
webpage). 
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from
several other stand-alone symposia: inter alia the Sout -North Exchange, the 
Study Space Series, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit 
Symposia, LATCRIT: LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC., http://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/ (last visited 
July 5, 2014). 
6 These include Professors Marc-Tizoc González, Andrea Freeman, and
César Cuahtémoc García Hernández. See About LatCrit, supra note 3 (listing 
the professors on the LatCrit Board of Directors and their respective law 
schools).  
7 Campo Sano, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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more variables and degrees of elasticities influence the triadic 
relation among the prisoners and prosecutor, the more complex 
their interaction becomes. Such a triadic and multivariable 
interaction thus invites the use of a different approach, such as 
complexity theory.92 This, however, will be the subject of a future 
paper. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Before concluding, we wish to say a few words about our 
general approach to the question posed in the title of our paper as 
well as our emphasis on questions (as opposed to answers) or 
“known unknowns”93 throughout this paper. To paraphrase Stuart 
Firestein, a neurobiologist at Columbia University, our implicit 
premise in these pages is that communal ignorance (that which we 
do not yet know) is the main fountain of knowledge and 
discovery.94 According to Firestein, ignorance promotes discovery 
because it motivates persons engaged in science to search for 
answers, and this pursuit, in turn, leads to new questions: 
“[ignorance] is not an individual lack of information but a 
communal gap in knowledge . . . This is knowledgeable ignorance, 
perceptive ignorance, insightful ignorance. It leads us to frame 
better questions, the first step to getting better answers.”95 We 
believe this counterintuitive and critical logic also applies to 
economics and law, and to the social sciences generally. Rather 
than restating what we already know (or think we know), as many 
conventional legal scholars and economists tend to do, we make 
greater progress when we pose new and non-trivial questions (i.e., 
questions to which we do not yet know the answers). 
In this paper, then, we identified the essential elements of the 
one-shot, two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma, the simplest and most 
famous of all models in game theory, and then presented a pure 
Coasean version of the dilemma, one in which the prisoners are 
allowed to communicate and bargain with each other, and not just 
with the prosecutor. We found that even when the prisoners are 
allowed to communicate and bargain with each other, there is 
       92 See generally MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR (2009). 
For applications to law, see Orlando I. Martínez-García, The Person in Law, 
the Number in Math, 18 AM. U. J. OF GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 503 (2010). 
93 Moran Cerf, Known Unknowns, 336 SCI. 1382 (2012) (reviewing STUART 
FIRESTEIN, IGNORANCE: HOW IT DRIVES SCIENCE (2012)). 
94 By “ignorance,” we follow Firestein in meaning “the absence of fact, 
understanding, insight, or clarity about something.” STUART FIRESTEIN, 
IGNORANCE: HOW IT DRIVES SCIENCE 6 (2012). 
95 Id. at 7. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Building upon the main theme of this year’s LatCrit 
Conference, Resistance Rising: Theorizing and Building Cross-
Sector Movements, 4 this paper (i.e., our contribution to this larger 
critical conversation) challenges one of the dominant paradigms in 
economics and law: the Coase Theorem.5 Specifically, e present a 
thought-experiment, what we shall call the “pure Coasean version” 
of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game.6 In brief, what if the 
prisoners in this game-theory parable were allowed to 
communicate and bargain with each other instead of being held in 
separate cells, as in the standard version of the dilemma? Would 
our prisoners strike a mutually-beneficial and collectively-optimal 
Coasean bargain, as the Coase Theorem predicts?7 Or, as 
predicted in the standard one-shot version of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in which bargaining is not allowed,8 would they still end 
3 A.W. Tucker, A Two-Person Dilemma: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950), as 
reprinted in Philip D. Straffin, Jr., The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14 
TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983).
4 Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., 2013 Biennial LatCrit 
Conference Pr gram Schedule (and Related Events), (2013), available a  
http://latcrit.org/media/medialibrary/2013/10/LatCrit2013_Conference_Progra
m_FinalR.pdf. 
5 The Coase Theorem is named after the late Ronald Coase. Ronald H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960). George 
Stigler, owever, was the economist w o first presented t e idea now known 
s th  Coase Theorem. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 
(MacMillan, 3d ed. 1966). George Stigler stated Coase’s idea as a “theorem” 
and coined the term “Coase Theorem.” Id. 
6 ee generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (Anchor 
B oks 1993) (providing an overview and history of the origins of the dilemma); 
see also F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners, 5–9 (June 21, 2013) 
[hereinafter Guerra-Pujol, The Parable of the Prisoners] (u published
manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2281593, (explaining the
prisoner’s parable). 
7 Id.
8 See infra Part I.B.  
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some positive probability that they might not strike a Coasean 
bargain. Furthermore, we found that even if they are able to 
negotiate a mutually beneficial agreement (e.g. through non-
strategic bargaining), there is also some positive probability that 
they could still breach such an agreement and end up defecting, 
contrary to what the Coase Theorem predicts. In either case, the 
probability of defection is a function of various factors, including 
such things as uncertainty, exponential discounting, and 
elasticity.  
This conclusion – the possibility of defection in the Coasean 
version of dilemma – is theoretically significant because it all but 
refutes or falsifies the Coase Theorem. It is also worth noting that 
our conclusion is not based on ad hoc behavioral or psychological 
quirks of human behavior. Uncertainty, exponential discounting, 
and elasticity are all part of the standard economics toolkit and 
are based on the standard rationality assumption of economics. 
The main contribution of the thought-experiment presented in this 
paper – our Coasean version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma – is that it 
poses many deep and difficult questions, and this paper is our first 
attempt in search of answers … and new questions. 
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different from its predecessors, particularly since i  had the ben fit
of two years of planning. 
Lik  the shift in conf rence sch duling, other chan es have 
taken place with  the LatCrit entity, including concerted efforts
o continue a proc ss of institutionalization. I  recent years, there
has been a growing focus on how to capitalize on its critical niche,
continue cultivating the next generation of critical scholars, a d
ensure that the baton of outsider jurisprudence is passed along.
Internally, the organization has shifted, including a gradual 
changing of the guard in leadership, so to speak, as well as a
downsizing in admini trati n. For example, from 2008 to the
present, the Board of Directors was intentionally downsized, with
a growing number of Board se ts being occupied by junior law
profes ors.6  
Ano her major development is L tCrit’s acquisition of a
physical space for the organization. The property, Campo Sano
(Spanish for “Camp Healthy,” or more lit ally, “Camp Sanity”), 
a ten-acre parcel of land l cated in Central Flor da.7 Purchased by
LatCrit i  2011, the space is home to The Living Justice Center
nd the LatCrit C mmunity Campus.8 The physical facility serves 
as a means “to level the playing field and give LatCrit activists a 
fighting chance to be heard.”9 The space is intended 
 
to serve as the hub of their educational, research, 
advocacy and activism to remedy the imbalance and 
deficiencies of the current legal system. Having an 
independent physical base has become critical as 
universities and law schools increasingly are even less 
Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).  
See also LatCrit Biennial Conferences, LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO 
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://latcrit.org/content/conferences/latcrit-
biennial-conferences/ (last visited July 5, 2013) (providing a list of the previous 
conferences, and providing direct links to view symposia articles for some 
years (found by following the respective year’s link to its corresponding 
webpage). 
Additionally, LatCrit has developed a substantial body of scholarship from 
several other stand-alone symposia: inter alia the South-North Exchange, the 
Study Space Series, the International and Comparative Colloquia. LatCrit 
Symposia, LATCRIT: LATCRIT: LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC., http://latcrit.org/content/publications/latcrit-symposium/ (last visited 
July 5, 2014). 
6 These include Professors Marc-Tizoc González, Andrea Freeman, and 
César Cuahtémoc García Hernández. See About LatCrit, supra note 3 (listing 
the professors on the LatCrit Board of Directors and their respective law 
schools).  
7 Campo Sano, LATCRIT: LATINA AND LATINO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, 
INC, http://www.latcrit.org/content/campo-sano/ (last visited July 5, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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